In this paper, we use the Generalized Taylor Economy ( GT E) framework to examine the optimal choice of in ‡ation index. In this otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, there can be many sectors, each with a di¤erent contract length. In the GT E framework with an empirically relevant contract structure, a simple rule under which the interest rate responds to economy-wide in ‡ation gives a welfare outcome nearly identical to the optimal policy. This …nding suggests that it may not be necessary for a well-designed monetary policy to respond to sector-speci…c in ‡ations.
Introduction
The optimal choice of an in ‡ation-index is an important question for policy makers. This paper aims to adress this issue in a model that accounts for the heterogeneity in contract lengths we observe in empirical data. To accomplish this we have used the Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E) Kara (2007, 2010) ). The GT E generalizes the simple Taylor model to allow for a distribution of contract lengths in di¤erent sectors
1 . An additional advantage of the GT E framework is that it is general enough to represent any distribution of contract lengths, including the one generated by the Calvo model. Dixon and Kara (2007) …nd that the GT E with a distribution of contract lengths based on the dataset of Bils and Klenow (2004) tracks the U.S. data well.
In this paper, we extend the GT E framework by assuming that each sector is subject to sector-speci…c productivity shocks. We then consider the design of welfare-maximising in ‡ation-targeting monetary policy rules in a setting where there are multiple sectors, each with a di¤erent contract length. We examine the monetary policy implications of alternative assumptions regarding the distribution of contract lengths and explore how to assign weights to di¤erent sectors in an optimal in ‡ation index for a central bank to target (i.e. sectoral in ‡ation-targeting). We then compare the performance of the aggregate in ‡ation targeting relative to the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule and ask if it is really necessary for a well-designed monetary policy to respond to sector-speci…c in ‡ation rates.
For this purpose, in our model we derive a utility-based objective function of a central bank by following the procedure described in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) . In doing so, we illustrate the challenge facing the central bank in an environment in which there are many sectors. In particular, we show that welfare in the GT E depends on the variances of the output gap and on the cross-sectional price dispersion. We …nd that in the GT E framework, in the presence of sector-speci…c shocks and nominal rigidities, it is impossible for the central bank to simultaneously stabilize all the objectives; as a result, the …rst-best allocation cannot be achieved. We then employ Lagrangian methods to determine the optimal policy and use it as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of alternative simple rules.
A main …nding of this paper is that in a model with an empirically relevant distribution of contract lengths, a simple rule under which the interest rate responds to economy-wide in ‡ation gives a welfare outcome close to the optimum, which suggests that it may not be necessary for a well-designed monetary policy to respond to sector-speci…c in ‡ations.
Before we turn to a description of the GT E model, we brie ‡y review the literature on this topic. A rapidly growing literature assesses the question of which in ‡ation index a central bank should target in models that allow for two sectors, such as those studied by Woodford (2003, p. 435-443) and Aoki (2001) , or with two countries such as that studied by Benigno (2004) . These studies …nd that targeting economy-wide in ‡ation is not optimal. Instead, they suggest a sectoral in ‡ation targeting rule that puts more weight on the sector in which there is a longer contract. Benigno (2004, p. 295) evaluates the gains from pursuing a sectoral in ‡ation targeting rule at around 0.02% of consumption. This result is consistent with the one we obtain with simple two-sector GT Es. We suggest, however, there is a limitation in studies like these which use models that have only two sectors. Clearly, generating a more realistic case requires going beyond the simple case of two-sector economies. Indeed, we …nd that in the GT E with an empirically relevant distribution of contract lengths the gains from pursuing sectoral in ‡ation targeting are smaller than what two sector-economies suggest and are virtually zero. In general, we believe that the GT E may be better at capturing the environment facing a central bank.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 describes equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 derives a welfare function for a central bank based on the representative household's utility function. Section 5 characterises the optimal policy and Section 6 analyses the implications of various assumptions regarding the distribution of contract lengths and compares the performance of alternative simple in ‡ation-targeting rules. Section 7 summarises our conclusions.
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The Model
The model we use is the GT E framework of Dixon and Kara (2007) . In this otherwise standard DSGE model, there can be many sectors, each with a di¤erent contract length. An advantage of the GTE approach is that it is general enough that the model can represent any distribution of contract lengths, including the one generated by the Calvo model. When all the contracts have the same duration in the economy, the model reduces to a standard Taylor model. The exposition here aims to outline the basic building blocks of the model. We …rst describe the structure of the economy, the behavior of …rms (which is standard), the wage-setting decision and monetary policy.
Structure of the Economy
In the model economy, there is a continuum of …rms f 2 [0; 1]. Corresponding to the continuum of …rms f , there is a unit interval of household-unions (h 2 [0; 1]). The economy is divided into N sectors, indexed by i = 1:::N . The share of each sector is given by i with P N i=1 i = 1: Within each sector i, each …rm is matched with a …rm-speci…c union(f = h): there are i equally sized cohorts j = 1:::i of unions and …rms 23 . Each cohort sets the wage which lasts for T i periods: one cohort moves each period. The share of each cohort j within the sector i is given by ij = 1 T i where P T i j=1 ij = 1. The longest contracts in the economy are N periods.
All other basic elements of the model are standard New Keynesian. A typical …rm produces a single di¤erentiated good. The production of intermediate goods requires labor as the only input. The …nal consumption good is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate over the differentiated intermediate goods. The representative household derives utility from consumption and leisure. The government conducts monetary policy and provides subsidies that o¤set any distortions in the steady state. The subsides are …nanced by lump-sum taxes.
Firms
A typical …rm in the economy produces a di¤erentiated good which requires labour as the only input, with a CRS technology represented by
where a it = log A it is a productivity shock in sector i and follows the AR(1) process: a it = i a it 1 + " it : f 2 [0; 1] is …rm speci…c index. Di¤erenti-ated goods Y t (f ) are combined to produce a …nal consumption good Y t : The production function here is CES and corresponding unit cost function P t
The demand for the output of …rm f is given by
The …rm chooses fP f t; Y f t ; L f t g to maximize pro…ts subject to (1, 3), yields the following solutions for price, output and employment at the …rm level given fY t ; W f t ; P t g :
Where " = 1 measures the markup. denotes a subsidy to employment, which re ‡ects our assumption that the labour income is subsidized in order to eliminate monopolistic distortion 4 . Therefore, in the steady state of the model prices are equal to marginal cost, as in the perfectly competitive economy. Price is an e¤ective markup (adjusted for subsidy) over marginal cost, which depends on the wage rate (W f t ) and the sector speci…c productivity shocks.
Household-Unions and Wage Setting
The representative household h has a utility function given by
where C ht , H ht are household h 0 s consumption and hours worked respectively, t is an index for time, 0 < < 1 is the discount factor, and h 2 [0; 1] is the household speci…c index.
The household's budget constraint is given by
where B h (s t+1 ) is a one-period nominal bond that costs Q(s t+1 j s t ) at state s t and pays o¤ one dollar in the next period if s t+1 is realized. B ht represents the value of the household's existing claims given the realized state of nature. W ht is the nominal wage, ht is the pro…ts distributed by …rms and W ht H ht is the labour income. denotes the …xed rate at which labour income is subsidized 5 . Finally, T t is a lump-sum tax. The …rst order conditions derived from the consumer's problem are as follows:
where
Equation (9) is the Euler equation. Equation (10) gives the gross nominal interest rate. Equation (11) shows that the optimal wage or the reset wage in sector i (X it ) is a constant "mark-up" (given by " which is adjusted for subsidy) over the ratio of marginal utilities of leisure and marginal utility from consumption within the contract duration s = t:::t + T i 1 6 . K t collects all the terms which the union treats exogenous. As mentioned before, denotes a subsidy to household-unions. Therefore, the steady state of the model satis…es the e¢ ciency condition that the marginal rate of substitution equals the real wage, as in a perfectly competitive economy. Note that the index h is dropped in equations (9) and (11), which re ‡ects our assumption of complete contingent claims markets for consumption and implies that consumption is identical across all households in every period (C ht = C t ):
The Government
The labour income subsidy is …nanced by lump sum taxes. In particular, we assume that
We do not specify a particular policy at this stage since our objective is to …nd an optimal monetary policy in the economy. However, given any monetary policy, an equilibrium can be computed.
Equilibrium Dynamics
We consider an equilibrium in which each sector i is identi…ed by the contract length T i and a household-union in each sector is identi…ed by the time at which it can set a new wage. We follow the standard approach of loglinearizing around the steady state of the model. We follow the notational convention that lower-case symbols represent log-deviations of variables from the steady state and variables with asterisks denote the equilibrium value of variables under ‡exible wages.
Log-linearized Economy
We now turn to characterize the sticky wage equilibrium of the economy. We render nominal variables such as wage level and price level as stationary by reexpressing them in terms of log-devations from the aggregate price level. For example, x it and p it denote the logarithmic deviation of the reset wage and price level in sector i from the aggregate price level, respectively.
The linearized wage decision equation (11) for sector i is given by
Whereỹ t = y t y t is the gap between actual output, y t and the ‡exible-price equilibrium output level y t , t is the aggregate in ‡ation rate and is the elasticity of substitution of consumption goods. cc = UccC Uc is the parameter governing risk aversion, ll = V ll L V l is the inverse of the labour elasticity.
In each sector i; the sectoral in ‡ation is related to the wage level in sector i through a relation of the form
Where p ijt = x it j a it is the logarithmic deviation of the price level in sector i cohort j from the aggregate price level.
By using the fact that the linearized price level in the economy is the weighted average of the ongoing prices in the economy, we obtain the following identity:
where p it can also be expressed as
Using these identities, aggregate in ‡ation can be expressed as
which implies that aggregate in ‡ation depends on both sectoral lagged relative prices and in ‡ation levels.
Since nominal rigidities arise due to the assumption of staggered wages and prices are perfectly ‡exible in the model, wage in ‡ation is given by
where w it denotes the wage in ‡ation in sector i and a it = a it a it 1 . Log-linearizing (9) gives
Using the log-linearized version of the household's intertemporal Euler equation (9) and subtracting the ‡exible-wage version, we obtain the Euler equation in terms of output gap, which is given bỹ
where rr t = r t E t t+1 = E t y t+1 y t denotes the real interest rate when prices are ‡exible. r t , f t and y t denote the nominal interest rate, the in ‡ation rate and the output level when prices are ‡exible, respectively.
The solution for y t is given by
9 where a t = P N i=0 i a it is the weighted average of productivity across all the sectors in the economy. This equation implies that the natural level of output is a weighted average of productivity across all the sectors in the economy.
When all wages are completely ‡exible, the wage decision does not depend on the in ‡ation level, as wages can adjust every period. Moreover, by de…nition the output gap is zero. Therefore, the wage setting rule (13) reduces to
Thus, the relative prices when prices are fully ‡exible are given by
This equation implies that relative prices ‡uctuate in response to shocks.
The welfare function for the GTE
This section generalises the analysis of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and derives a utility-based objective function of a central bank to provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of alternative in ‡ation-targeting monetary policy rules. The welfare function is given by the sum of all households' utility function:
Consumption is identical across all households in every period, re ‡ecting our assumption of complete contingent; but labour can vary across cohorts.
As shown in the appendix, by taking the second-order logarithmic approximation to this utility function around a steady state, the welfare function can be expressed as
where the loss function is given by
andp ijt = p ijt p ijt denotes the relative price gap: This expression implies that welfare loss depends on the variance of the output gap and on the cross-sectional price dispersion. Sectors di¤er based on their contract length and their budget share. When there is only one type of contract length in the economy, the function reduces to the welfare function in a standard one sector model, as in Paustian (2005) .
Note that this welfare function is roughly analogous to those obtained under the popular speci…cation of the Calvo model. One main di¤erence between the GT E and the Calvo model is that in the Calvo model the wage setters do not know how long the wage will last. In that model, each period, a randonly chosen fraction ! of cohorts, adjust their wages. Note that all resetting cohorts set the same wage. Therefore, in the Calvo model in each period there is only one reset wage (N = 1). In contrast, in the GT E there is a distribution of sector speci…c reset wages, x it ; in each period. However, the Calvo process can be described in deterministic terms at the aggregate level because there the …rm-level randomness disappears. To put it di¤erently, at the aggregate level, the precise identity of individual …rms does not matter; what matters is the proportion of …rms that set contracts of particular lengths at particular times. The steady-state cross-section of contract ages can be described by the proportion ij of cohorts surviving at least j periods: ij = ! (1 !) j 1 : j = 1::1: Therefore, the welfare function for the Calvo model is given by
Woodford (2003) shows that the welfare costs of cross-sectional price dispersion can be summarised in terms of variability of in ‡ation in the Calvo model. In contrast, in the GT E; this is not the case: the welfare costs of cross-sectional dispersion cannot be summarised in terms of variability of in‡ation and must be given explicitly in terms of variances of relative prices. This is mainly because in the GT E; there is a distribution of sector-speci…c reset wages in each period.
A comparison with the welfare function derived in Aoki (2001) is useful. The loss function in Aoki (2001) is di¤erent from ours beacuse of slightly di¤erent model structures. If we were to adopt the modelling approach of Aoki (2001) , then loss function in the new model would depend on the variability of the output gap, the dispersion of prices across …rms in sector i
i.e.
2 and the variability of the sectoral relative price gap (i.e. the deviation of sectoral relative price from its e¢ cient level). The di¤erence arises from the fact that in the GT E, there is a continuum of …rms that produce di¤erentiated goods, which are then combined to produce the …nal consumption good. The production function is Dixit-Stiglitz. Therefore, the demand for an individual …rm depends only on its own price and the general price index (see equation (3)). While we divide the unit interval into segments corresponding to sectors and cohorts within sectors, this need not re ‡ect any objective factor in terms of sector or cohort speci…c aspects of technology or preferences. Sectors are composed of …rms that have the same contract length and are hit by the same shocks. Thus, there is no sense of location and i and ij can best be thought of as simply measures of sector and cohort size. As noted in Dixon and Kara(2007) , this is an important property, that allows it to be demonstrated that a Calvo economy can be represented by a GTE. However, Aoki's model has a typical two-sector structure. If we were to follow the Aoki approach, then we would have to assume that there are two sectors, each producing a di¤erent consumption goods. Within each sector, there are many …rms, represented by a continuum over the unit interval. The sector's output is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the …rms'output. The …nal consumption is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate over the goods in the two sectors of the economy. Therefore, the demand for an individual …rm in sector i depends on its own price and the general price level in sector i. The demand for sector i depends on the general price level in sector i and the general price level in the economy. Therefore, in such a setting the welfare function depends on the dispersion of prices across sectors and …rms as well as the variance of the output gap. Thus, Aoki used a model and, therefore, a loss function di¤erent from ours. Nonetheless, as we will show later, his conclusions carry over to our setting. Another related paper is that by Erceg and Levin (2006) . Erceg and Levin (2006) assume that the sectors are completely independent from each other. Therefore, the loss function in Erceg and Levin (2006) depends on the volatility of the sectoral output gap and on the dispersion of prices across …rms in each sector.
Optimal Monetary Policy in the GTE
We turn now to examining the issue of optimal monetary policy. We begin with considering if the Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved in the GTE.
As the welfare function shows, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal in the GTE only if the relative prices and output gap is zero in every period, that isỹ t =p it = 0 for all t:
In the GTE, it is impossible to satisfy all of the stabilisation objectives at the same time: therefore, Pareto optimal allocation is not attainable. To see this, assume that the economy starts in a steady state in which all gaps are zero. When the sector speci…c productivity shocks hit the economy in period t, in the e¢ cient equilibrium, both output and relative prices ‡uctuate in response to the shocks. The central bank cannot stabilize both of them at the same time. This is most easily seen by considering the evolution of the output level in sector i, where 1 < i N: For expositional simplicity, without loss of generality, let cc = 1: Then, the relative prices when wages are fully ‡exible is p it = (a t a it ) and, therefore, the output gap in sector i is given byỹ
This equation makes clear that in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks, closing the gap in sector i requires that prices adjust. Thus, in the GT E, in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks, in the e¢ cient equilibrium both output and relative prices ‡uctuates in response to shocks, creating a trade-o¤ for the central bank.
In contrast, when all shocks are identical, the Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved. This is because when shocks are identical, in the e¢ cient equilibrium only output ‡uctuates in response shocks. Consider the scenario in which the central bank implements a policy that closes all of the sectoral output gaps. A zero sectoral output gap would induce …rms to choose a relative price of zero. Thus, in this case, stabilising output automatically stabilises prices.
Recent work by Blanchard and Gali (2007) shows that a policy tradeo¤ between price stability and output gap stability emerges if real wage rigidities are introduced into the standard model. It is di¢ cult to draw a precise isomorphism between the model in this paper and that in Blanchard and Gali (2007) , as Blanchard and Gali (2007) employ the ad hoc device of real wage rigidities. Therefore, the mechanism at work in this paper may suggest a more plausible mechanism to generate a trade-o¤ than the one proposed by Blanchard and Gali (2007) .
Second-Best Optimal Policy
As the discussion in the previous section reveals, in the GT E it is not possible to achieve the …rst-best allocation. Accordingly, in this case one must consider the second-best optimal policy. We use Lagrangian methods to characterize the second best optimal monetary policy. In particular, we compute the optimal policy that can be obtained by maximizing the welfare level de…ned in (24) subject to the equilibrium conditions (13) -(18). While this is an useful reference, as discussed in Huang and Liu (2005) , it is di¢ cult to implement, as it requires the knowledge of leads and lags of the in ‡ation rates and the output gap. Therefore, we use the central bank's …rst order conditions along with the equilibrium conditions for the model to solve and calculate the level of welfare under optimal monetary policy. We then use this level as a benchmark to compare the performance of alternative simple rules, with the coe¢ cients in front of the targeting variables are chosen to maximize welfare. These are considered as feasible and e¤ective tools to implement monetary policy.
Alternative Simple Policy Rules
We assume that the central bank has adopted an in ‡ation-targeting regime. We consider two policy rules. The …rst rule is a sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule under which the central bank responds to an appropriately weighted average of the sectoral wage in ‡ation rates 8 . In this case, the interest rate rule takes the following form:
where w t represents the wage in ‡ation in sector i: The reaction coe¢ cients in front of the targeting variables ( coe¢ cients) are optimally chosen. The weight that sector i receives in the optimal in ‡ation index is given by
The second rule is an aggregate in ‡ation-targeting one under which the central bank responds to aggregate wage in ‡ation. This rule takes the following form:
w it is aggregate wage in ‡ation. The reaction coe¢ -cient, a , is optimally chosen.
Choice of Parameters and Computation
We use a discount factor of 0:99 which corresponds to the annual real interest rate in the steady state of 4%. As discussed in Dixon and Kara (2007) , we set ll = 4:5; implying that intertemporal labour supply elasticity, 1= ll , is 0:2: We set = 6. This measures the elasticity of substitution between goods. We set the relative aversion in consumption, CC ; as unity. Finally, we set the i = 0:95 and the standard deviations of innovations to productivity shocks i = 0:02, a standard assumption in the literature (e.g. Huang and Liu (2005) ).
Computation
All calculations are performed using Dynare version 3.06 (see Juillard (1996) ). To compute the optimal weights in the optimal in ‡ation index, we numerically minimise the welfare loss with respect to the parameters in the monecost of business cycles, here we consider the cases in which the in ‡ation measure that the central bank chooses to target is the wage in ‡ation rather than the price in ‡ation, as is suggested by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) . In another exercise that we do not report here, we consider policy rules that respond to the price in ‡ation. We …nd that, not surprisingly, the performance of the wage in ‡ation rule is always better compared to the price in ‡ation rule.
tary policy rule ( coe¢ cients), subject to the equilibrium conditions and additional non-negativity constraints: i > 0 9 .
Results
We now proceed to examine how the policy rules perform under alternative assumptions regarding the distribution of contract lengths. To do this, we allow for di¤erent distributions of contracts in the GT E framework, and for each case, we evaluate the performance under the alternative simple rules in comparison to that under optimal policy. In order to illustrate the nature of the problem faced by the monetary authority in the model and the implications of sectoral heterogeneity for policy design, we start with the simple case of two-sector GTE s, a common assumption in the literature. We then explore monetary policy implications of the model that assumes a wider range of contract lengths, consistent with the evidence provided by recent studies (e.g. Bils and Klenow (2004) ). Throughout the paper, welfare levels (W ) are expressed in terms of the equivalent percentage decline in steady state consumption, which can be obtained by dividing W by U c C (and multiplying by 100). Welfare levels under optimal policy corresponds to that under the second-best optimal policy discussed in section 5.1.
Simple GTEs
We start by considering the simple case of two-sector GT Es. In particular, we let the assumed contract length in sector 2 vary between complete ‡exibility (T 2 = 1) and 8-period contracts (T 2 = 8); while assuming T 1 = 2: In each case, we assume that sectors have equal shares and calculate the welfare losses under di¤erent policy regimes: the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule, the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule and the optimal policy. Figure 1 reports the welfare losses under the three policy schemes; Figure 2 plots the optimal weights on Sector 2 in the optimal in ‡ation index when the central bank adopts the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting. We begin by comparing the performance of the alternative rules. As Figure 1 shows, the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule outperforms the aggregate in ‡ation targeting rule and yields a welfare outcome nearly identical to the optimal policy, except in the case where sectors have identical contract lengths. Not surprisingly, when the sectors have identical contract lengths, the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule performs as well as the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule. Figure 2 shows that if the central bank adopts the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule, the optimal rule places the largest weight on the sector in which the prices are stickier. Moreover, the optimal weight that the long-contract sector receives increases with the contract length in that sector. That is, the longer the contract duration in sector 2, the higher weight the sector should receive in the optimal in ‡ation index. Thus, a simple rule that puts more weight on the sector that has longer contracts brings the welfare level not too far from the optimal policy. These results are in line with the …ndings of Benigno (2004) and Woodford (2003) . In addition, if one sector has fully ‡exible wages, then the central bank should react to the sector that has sticky wages, a practice in line with the …ndings of Aoki (2001) .
In order to understand these results, …rst note that price stickiness dampens the e¤ect of a shock on prices. In other words, when prices are sticky, …rms cannot change their prices as much as they would when prices are ‡ex-ible. This sluggish adjustment means that a small change in prices implies a large change in …rms'optimal prices. This is because …rms, when resetting their prices, take into account the fact that they will have to charge the same price during the contract length. Since there is a trade-o¤ between price stability and the output gap stability, the large movements in …rms' price require large movements in the output gap to control price stability.
In the case of a two-sector economy, an in ‡ation-targeting central bank can o¤set the disruptive e¤ect of the stickier sector by putting a greater weight on that sector. In addition, as discussed in Dixon and Kara (2007) , in the GT E model the presence of the longer contracts in ‡uences the wagesetting behavior of short-term contracts via the aggregate price level. In other words, there is a spillover e¤ect from the sluggish long-contract sectors to the short-contract sectors via the aggregate price level. Given the fact that prices in the long-contract sector will adjust sluggishly in response to technology shocks means that prices in the short-contract sector will also adjust sluggishly. As a result, the presence of longer contracts would be even more disruptive. A policy rule that can minimize the disruptive e¤ect of the long-contract sector can also minimize the disruptive e¤ect of the longercontract sector on the aggregate price level and hence on the short-contract sector. In contrast, the aggregate in ‡ation targeting rule is less e¤ective in controlling price stability because this rule implicitly puts too much emphasis on the short-contract sector. This occurs because the target weights under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting scheme are not optimally chosen and are the sectoral weights. Reduced target weight of the long-contract sector under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule means that this policy cannot o¤set the disruptive e¤ect of the long-contract sector as much as the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting can. As a consequence, under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting scheme, aggregate in ‡ation will move sluggishly. As noted above, higher degree of persistence means larger movements in the output gap are required to control price stability. Larger ‡uctuation under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting scheme leads to a signi…cant deterioration in social welfare. Figure  3 con…rms this intuition. Reported there are the standard deviations of the output gap under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule and the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule. As the table shows, the standard deviation of the output gap under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule can be several times larger than that under the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule. Figure 3 here Finally, we can ask the question: how much welfare gain is derived from moving to the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule from the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule. To provide an answer, we consider the case in which the welfare gains from switching to the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule, as Figure  1 indicates, is largest: a two sector economy in which sector 1 wages adjust every period and sector 2 wages adjust every two periods. The welfare gain from switching the sectoral in ‡ation targeting policy is around 0.02% of consumption. If we assume that in sector 2 wages adjust every 8 periods rather than every 2 periods and hold the other factors constant, the gain goes up to 0.03%. Note that the scale of welfare gains is in line with those in Benigno (2004) .These numbers, however, do not seem large. However, there are gains in following the sectoral in ‡ation targeting policy. In fact, given that Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved in these cases, the sectoral in ‡ation targeting rule eliminates the welfare cost associated with price stickiness.
Distribution of Contract Lengths
We have thus far considered simple GT Es, in which there are only two sectors. We now examine the implications for optimal monetary policy design of allowing a wider range of contract lengths in order to see if the conclusion based on two sectors carries over to a more realistic, empirically relevant case. We will consider some special GT Es that assume more than two sectors.
Taylor' s US Economy
In this section, we use the study by Taylor (1993) to calibrate the U.S. economy. Taylor calibrates the U.S. economy as T = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8); with sector shares of 1 = 0:07; 2 = 0:19; 3 = 0:23; 4 = 0:21; 5 = 0:15; Table 1 here Figure 4 here First, the welfare gain in switching to the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule is even smaller than what two-sector economies suggest. In Taylor's US economy, as evident from Table 1 , the welfare gain is only 0.002% of steady state consumption, which is about a tenth of what it is in two-sector economies. Second, if the central bank follows a sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule, then the optimal rule does not necessarily place the largest weight on the in ‡ation rates where contract lengths are the longest. Table 2 here The …rst result noted here raises a natural question: why is the welfare gain of moving from aggregate in ‡ation-targeting to sectoral in ‡ation-targeting quantitatively so much smaller in a model with distribution of contract lengths than in a model with two sectors? The main reason for this result is that in a model that accounts for the heterogeneity of contract durations that we observe in empirical data, ‡uctuations in the output gap are less costly compared to those in a model with only two sectors. A greater degree of nominal rigidity in an economy with a distribution makes it more important to control price stability and that reduces the relative weight of the output gap term in the loss function. As Table 2 shows, as in the case of twosector economies, the volatility of the output gap is indeed lower under the sectoral rule compared with volatility under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule. However, since controlling price stability is more important in Taylor's U.S. economy due to a higher degree of price dispersion, the output gap term receives less weight in the loss function. As a result, deterioration in social welfare caused by a larger degree of ‡uctuations in the output gap under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting scheme in Taylor's economy is small. Figure 5 here Perhaps the importance of this channel can be best illustrated by varying the share of the ‡exible sector in the economy from 0:07 to 0:5 and reallocating the remaining shares to the other sectors according to their relative importance in the sectoral index. Clearly, as the ‡exible-sector share increases, the longer-contract sectors receive less weight and, as a consequence, the degree of nominal rigidity in the economy decreases. Figure 5 reports the welfare losses under the two policy regimes when the share of the ‡exible-contract sector varies from 0:07 to 0:5. As the …gure shows, the welfare gain of moving from aggregate-in ‡ation targeting to sectoral-in ‡ation targeting increases as the longer contract sectors become less important in the economy and the economy becomes more ‡exible. This is because a lower degree of nominal rigidity makes it less important to control price stability, increasing the relative weight that the variance of the output gap term receives in the loss function.
The second result reported above suggests that the shape of the distribution is crucial when constructing an optimal in ‡ation index for a central bank to target. As Figure 4 shows, the longer contracts, more important in the optimal index, get higher weights. More speci…cally, the optimal weights are less than the corresponding sectoral weight for the sectors that have relatively short contracts; but as the contract length increases, the sectors with longer contracts start to get higher weights compared with the sectoral weights. As contract length further increases, the optimal weights decline because the sectoral shares fall. In other words, in Taylor's U.S. economy, the most common durations 3; 4 and 5 each have about 20% share and there are only a few …rms that belong to the longest (8-period) contract. The behavior of these latter …rms simply does not matter as much for optimal policy. In fact, this intuition carries over to the case in which there are only two sectors in the economy. Consider, for example a case in which sector 1 has a 2-period contract with a share of 95%, while sector 2 has an 8-period contract with a share of 5%. In this case, the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule places the largest weight on the short-contract sector. The optimal weight of the 2-period contract sector is around 60%, while the optimal weight of the 8-period contract sector is 40%. This result clearly shows that, even if one assumes that a two-sector economy closely approximates either the U.S. economy or the Euro-Area, the optimal weight that a sector receives depends also on the share of a sector in the economy. A failure to take into account a sector's share, when designing an in ‡ation index for a central bank to target, can thus result in policies that are suboptimal. Although this …nding may seem obvious, the perception in the existing literature that the sector that has the longest contract receives the largest weight in the optimal in ‡ation index arises from the assumption that the sectors have equal sizes.
Bils-Klenow GT E (BK-GT E)
Finally, we consider the implications of the Bils-Klenow GT E (BK-GT E); based on the Bils and Klenow (2004) data set. This is for price data, but we use it as an illustrative data set. The data are derived from the US Consumer Price Index data collected by the Bureau of Labor statistics. The period covered is 1995-7, and the 350 categories account for 69% of the CPI. The data set gives the average proportion of prices changing per month for each category. We assume that these data are generated by a simple Calvo process within each sector. We generate the distribution of durations for that category using Dixon and Kara (2006) . We then sum over all sectors using the category weights. For computational purposes, the distribution is truncated at N = 20, with the 20-period contracts absorbing all of the weights from the longer contracts 10 . The distribution in terms of quarters is plotted in Figure 6 . The mean contract length is 4.4 quarters. There is a very long tail, indicating some very long contracts: over 3% of weighted categories have less than 5% of prices changing per month, implying average contract lengths of over 40 months. However, the most common contracts durations is one quarter. Table 1 's row 2 reports the welfare losses in the BK-GT E under the two policy regimes. Figure 6 plots the optimal weights of each sector in the optimal in ‡ation index.
In Table 1 , the conclusion of the previous section appears robust: the welfare gain from switching from the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule to the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule is as low as 0:006% of steady state consumption. This is the case even though the share of the ‡exible-contract sector is as high as 30%. The results in the previous sections suggest that the welfare gains between the two in ‡ation-targeting regimes are the largest when the ‡exible-contract sector has a large share in the economy. In fact, the large share of the ‡exible-contracts sector in the BK-GT E explains why the welfare gain from moving to sectoral in ‡ation-targeting from aggregate in ‡ation-targeting is larger than in Taylor's US economy. However, the welfare gain from moving to sectoral in ‡ation-targeting is still small due to the presence of a wider range of contracts in the BK-GT E. The implications in the BK-GT E for the optimal weights that sectors receive in the optimal in ‡ation index di¤er from those found in Taylor's US economy. The distribution of the optimal weights is plotted in Figure 6 . The BK-GT E suggests that the longest-contract sector should receive the largest weight in the optimal in ‡ation index and other sectors in which prices are sticky should receive more or less the same weight. The di¤erence in conclusions seems to arise from the fact that, in the BK-GT E, the most common duration is one quarter and a longer duration corresponds to a smaller proportion of …rms. In contracts in Taylor's economy, ‡exible-contracts total only 7%, and the most common durations of 3; 4 and 5 each have about 20% share in the distribution. Since the most common durations are relatively long and there are only a few …rms in the longest-contract sector, the longest contracts (8-period) do not matter much to designing the optimal policy. The same result also shows how tentative the results are. In fact, the sensitivity of the results to the shape of a distribution makes it di¢ cult to generalize the consequences for optimal weights in a multi-sector economy.
Discussion
The results above indicate that the improvement in welfare from moving to the sectoral in ‡ation targeting policy is fairly small. Moreover, the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule has limitations. The main limitation of this policy is that, as the results in the previous section indicate, it requires measuring all sectoral characteristics. This is a di¢ cult task.
It is also important to note that even though there is more evidence about the degree of nominal rigidity in di¤erent sectors than ever before 11 , there is still a great deal of uncertainty about the distribution of contract lengths. Take the Bils and Klenow (2004) distribution, for example. In deriving this distribution, following Bils and Klenow (2004) , we assume that within each sector there is a Calvo-style contract. However, it is important to recognise that this is just an assumption. The statistic that Bils and Klenow (2004) report is the proportion of …rms that change price in a month. This statistic tells us nothing about the distribution of contract lengths within sectors. Thus, this statistic has a limited value and the true distribution may be completely di¤erent from what we get when we assume that within each sector there is a Calvo distribution. If this is true, following the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting policy may lead to large welfare losses.
Thus, the central banks may prefer to follow the aggregate in ‡ation targeting policy for two reasons. First, the aggregate in ‡ation targeting policy is easier to implement, as aggregate in ‡ation is readily available. Second, such a rule closely approximates the outcomes under the sectoral in ‡ation targeting policy.
Conclusions
When examining the implications of the heterogeneity of contracts lengths on optimal monetary policy design, the standard approach is to consider economies in which there are only two sectors. But more realistic analysis requires considering economies with many sectors, each with a di¤erent contract length and modelling the distribution of contract lengths using empirical data. The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the implications of ignoring the heterogeneity of contract lengths on the optimal choice of in ‡ation index. To accomplish this we have used the Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E) framework to analyze the design of monetary policy rules in an economy where there can be many sectors with di¤erent contract lengths. We have generalized the analysis of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and have derived a utility-based objective function of a central bank to provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of alternative in ‡ation-targeting monetary policy rules in an economy in which there are many sectors with di¤erent contract lengths. We have then compared the performance of two alternative policy rules. The …rst is the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule under which the nominal interest rate reacts to the appropriately weighted average of the in ‡ation rates in di¤erent sectors. The second is the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule under which the nominal interest rate targets aggregate in ‡ation. Two results emerge from the analysis in this paper.
First, the results suggest that in a model that assumes an empirically relevant distribution of contract lengths, the performance of an aggregate in ‡ation-targeting scheme closely approximates the performance of a sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule in which an appropriately weighted average of sectoral in ‡ation rates is targeted. However, a two-sector model suggests that the welfare gain is larger. The main di¤erence between the rules is that aggregate in ‡ation targeting rule requires a larger deviation of output from potential to control price stability. Higher volatility in the output gap when aggregated in ‡ation is targeted leads to a larger deterioration in social welfare in twosector models than in a model with a distribution. This is because, for a given mean, the presence of long-term contracts in an economy with a wider range of contracts leads to a higher degree of price dispersion. Increased price dispersion makes it more important to control price stability, reducing the importance of the output gap term in the central bank loss function. Therefore, higher volatility in the output gap under the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting scheme is less costly in a multi-sector economy.
Second, if the central bank adopts a sectoral in ‡ation-targeting rule, then the optimal rule does not necessarily place the largest weight on the in ‡a-tion rate in the sector where the contract length is the longest. In two-sector economies, the optimal weights that sectors receive in the optimal in ‡ation index depend on the contract length in that sector as well as the sector's share. The intuition is simple: if there are only a few …rms with long contracts, the behavior of these …rms simply does not matter signi…cantly for optimal policy. Although this …nding may seem obvious, the existing literature commonly claims that the sector with the longest contract receives the largest weight in the optimal in ‡ation index because of the simplifying assumption that sectors have equal sizes. In a model with a distribution of contract lengths, the optimal weights sectors receive depend on the shape of the distribution. The experiments reported in the paper suggest that if a distribution looks like a geometric distribution (i.e. a longer duration corresponds to a smaller share of the sector), then the sector with the longest contracts receives the greatest weight. On the other hand, if there is a hump-shaped distribution, then the longest-contract sector does not receive the greatest weight. In this case, the sectors in which prices are sticky but have a large weight in the sectoral index receive a larger weight than the longest-contract sector. This sensitivity makes it di¢ cult to generalize results of optimal weights when there is a distribution of contract lengths.
The results suggest that central banks may still prefer to follow the aggregate in ‡ation-targeting rule rather than the sectoral in ‡ation targeting rule. Such a rule is easier to implement, since this rule does not require to measuring all sectoral characteristics and since it closely approximates the performance of the sectoral in ‡ation-targeting.
Using the de…nition of price P t and taking a second order approximation of e
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